|
|||||||
|
|
|
|||||
|
|
|||||||
 |
There is this saying in the Intelligence Community that "Intelligence is
the second oldest of the worlds professions and is only slightly more respectable..."
One of the earliest examples of Intelligence comes from the Bible.
In Numbers XIII: 2-19, Moses sent a leader from each of the tribes of Israel
to spy out the land of Canaan. These spies succeeded, but misinterpretation
of the findings started the Israelites on a 40 year tour of the Sinai.
The Canadian Intelligence
Community traces its origins to those British and French officers who were
employed at various times in the early history of the country as scouts,
guides, agents, liaison officers and on other duties. The British
Army of the 19th Century, which included such colonial militias as the
Canadian, owed much of its organization and procedures to principles laid
down by the Duke of Wellington. In his campaigns, Wellington had
been his own intelligence officer, however, he created an intelligence
organization on 02 June 1809 based on the scout or guide. Guide units
were composed of irregular, light horsemen, normally recruited in the country
and employed solely to collect information, either by observing, or by
conversation with the local inhabitants. The guides were under the
control of a "Captain of Guides", an officer whose services Wellington
called "most essential, there being no map of country and no person capable
of giving information of a topographical nature."
Wellingtons guides
disappeared at the end of the Napoleonic Wars only to be reformed on 14
December 1846 in India. They were a rough bunch of men, recruited
from every warlike tribe on the frontier and commanded by a "European officer".
They were the first unit to wear Khaki uniforms; and in 1878, they also
became the first to wear the Sam Browne belt, named after their one-armed
commander, who invented it.
The first Guides
unit in Canada was the "4th Troop of Volunteer Cavalry of Montreal (or
Guides)", formed on 07 February 1862 during the reign of Queen Victoria.
On 17 April 1863, the units name was changed to "The Royal Guides" or the
Governor General's Bodyguard. The title conflicted with that of a
Toronto unit and political pressure forced a third name change on 13 April
1866 to "The Royal Guides or Governor General's Bodyguard for lower Canada";
its short title being "The Royal Guides". In 1866 the Guides were
called out to help with the Fenian raiders attacking Canada from the United
States. They took part in an action near St-Armand, Quebec on 09
June that saw the enemy withdraw across the border. There being no
further need, the unit was disbanded on 13 August 1869.
In 1884, Louis
Riel returned to Canadian Northwest from the United States. On 26
March 1885, fighting broke out between the Mounted Police and Riel's
forces. Major General Frederick Middleton, GOC, Canadian Militia,
was ordered to go at once and restore law and order. Middleton who
was in the West at the time raised a field force from local Militia units
and asked Ottawa for further reinforcements. Among the units
sent were Scouts.
One such unit
was formed from the Dominion Land Survey and had a strength of three officers
and 30 men. Militia orders called the unit the "Intelligence
Corps", the first such identification in the British Empire.
It became known as "The Dominion Land Surveyor's Intelligence Corps".
Other scout units performed a light cavalry function as well as their more
normal role of long-range patrol reconnaissance, locating and reporting
on parties of Indians. They may have been undisciplined, untrained,
and unused to war, but they were tough, self-reliant outdoors men who were
much less costly to raise and maintain than regular cavalry would have
been. The units were all disbanded by 18 September 1885 and with
two exceptions, vanished from the Canadian Militia scene. The unit
from Winnipeg has been perpetuated in the Fort Garry Horse and the Qu'Appelle
in the North Saskatchewan Regiment.
During the South
African (BOER) war, many Canadians served in all contingents, both official
and irregular forces, raised for the war. Many of these Canadians
served with different British scout units and with the wholly Canadian
unit, the Lord Strathcona's Horse. The British Army at the time fielded
a large intelligence organization. This organization was really the
forerunner of the intelligence as we know it today. Several Canadians
trained and served in this British system during the war.
On 6 February
1901, the Canadian Militia appointed its first Intelligence Staff Officer
(ISO) LCol VB Rivers, RCA. This officers work culminated in the authority
which created the Corps of Guides in the Canadian Army, General Order 61
of 01 Apr 1903. This order directed that in each of the 12 Military
Districts across Canada there would be a District Intelligence Officer
(IO), whose duties included command of the Corps of Guides in his District.
(These Districts were numbered from 1 to 13, with the number 9 deleted).
Each Military District was sub-divided into regimental areas and further
sub-divided into local Guide areas. The head of this organization
was the Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), under the control
of the General Officer Commanding (GOC). The first DGMI was LCol
WAC Denny, RASC, a veteran of South Africa. This was the basic organization
for Intelligence with which Canada entered World War I.
The guides were
a mounted unit and wore a white standard pattern helmet, khaki tunic with
lancer front and a scarlet collar and cuffs, khaki trousers with a 1 3/4
inch scarlet stripe, black boots, box spurs, cavalry pattern sword, and
greatcoat. The khaki and scarlet in the uniform were the same as
those worn by the Guides of India.
 |
Their badges were
in silver or white metal, 'the true and magnetic north points' entwined
in a scroll inscribed: GUIDES, CANADA. Below , a scroll bearing the
motto VIRTUE ET LABORE meaning 'By Valour and Exertion', the whole enclosed
within a wreathe of maple leaves surmounted by the Tudor Crown. In
1917, a green band replaced the scarlet band on the DIO's cap, hence the
origin of the green colour identified with the Intelligence Branch of current.
Canada was still
only a subordinate member of the British Empire when war was declared on
the 4th of August 1914. The machinery of strategic intelligence was
therefore located in, responsible to, and managed by Whitehall. Though
the Canadian Director General of Military Intelligence had been required
since 1903 "to gather information on foreign armies, militia, military
engineering" and to prepare reports for any army in the field, Militia
Headquarters in Ottawa had no direct access to official foreign sources
(there were no Canadian offices abroad). In the First World War,
Canadian Army personnel were attached to the British Intelligence Corps
for employment in intelligence duties such as liaison and counter intelligence.
Others were concentrated in the Canadian Corps of Guides and carried out
similar functions in Canada and overseas with the Canadian Expeditionary
Force (CHEF).
At this time,
the Corps of Guides numbered 499 all ranks, but there was no establishment
for Guides in the British organization on which the Canadian Expeditionary
Force was based. Those guides who volunteered had to be assigned
to other units and many went into the Canadian Corps of Cyclists.
In September of
1914 a cyclist company was authorized for each Canadian Division, leading
to the formation of five cyclist companies. In 1916, the first three
companies were absorbed by the Canadian Cyclist Battalions, the two other
companies being broken up for reinforcements for these Battalions.
 |
The Battalions
were further reinforced by the cyclists draft. Up until 1918, however,
the Cyclist Battalions had no scope as cyclists and were employed for a
wide variety of duties, including spells as infantry in the front line
trenches. During the great advance of 1918 they came into their own
as liaison and reconnaissance units and suffered heavy casualties in keeping
the Canadian Command in touch with the rapidly changing disposition of
both sides.
Many other Guides
officers however, became Intelligence staff officers and NCO's in various
other units including the Canadian Corps Headquarters (HQ). The Corps
HQ Intelligence Staff included a GSO2 responsible for Corps Intelligence
policy and for overseeing the exploitation of all sources of information.
The staff conducted interrogations and issued an Intelligence Summary at
regular intervals, which contained all known enemy information, including
translations from enemy documents.
A counter espionage
section of the Corps establishment was also created in 1918 and was known
as Intelligence (b). I(b) was mainly composed of Canadians who had trained
and served as linguists or policemen in the various British armies.
They successfully identified and arrested hundreds of enemy agents involved
in clandestine activity.
In the field,
the Canadian Expeditionary Force fought as a subordinate formation within
the British Command structure. As such, even in the later stages
of the war, it had no direct access to senior sources and agencies, but
had instead, to conform to the GHQ assessments. Because of the much
more rigid and immobile character of the war, this lack of direct access
was less restrictive than it would have been in the Second World War.
In fact, most of the Corps in the line were quite adequately served by
the intelligence facilities within their control.
After the war,
the Corps of Guides units in Canada were also converted to cyclist companies.
The cyclists were originally intended to be used to protect the main force
from surprise, much like the armoured reconnaissance of today. However,
the years between the wars were lean ones for Intelligence. The Guides
lost their appeal and due to costs were disbanded on 31 March 1929.
This left only a small staff in Ottawa and some districts to carry out
intelligence functions.
On 4 April 1932,
the Air Force Intelligence Staffs of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)
were amalgamated with the remaining Military Intelligence Staffs of the
Canadian Army.
Following Canada's
declaration of war on 10 September 1939, the Canadian Intelligence Corps
was one of the several military establishments which the pressing necessities
of war brought into being. However, while many of its personnel were
active as early as 1939, it was not until 29 October 1942 that it was officially
recognized as a Corps. Unlike its British counterpart (formed 25
June 1940), it had none of the experience on which a firm foundation could
be built. Like so many other military departments of comparatively
recent origin, it was forced to suffer the consequences of hasty improvisation.
Once it had achieved organic structure, it developed an orderliness and
flexibility that compared favourably to that of the older and more rigid
organizations.
During the first
year of the war, the field of military intelligence in Canada was virtually
non-existent. There was no pre-war structure on which to build, and
considerable doubt existed as to where the jurisdiction of the civil authorities
left off and the military began. The result was weakness in certain
aspects. The basic need for an intelligence organization of a purely
military nature was early recognized as a natural consequence of the Army's
rapid expansion and the degree to which military research was being developed.
Canada, long isolated
from physical contact with the turmoil of European affairs, awakened suddenly
to the realization that her very isolation, with her untold wealth in natural
resources, her proximity to the only Great Power in the western hemisphere,
and her military unpreparedness, were threats to her security. With
her four thousand miles of unprotected frontier to the south affording
few obstacles to enemy sympathizers, her congested industrial area, and
her strategic importance to the Commonwealth efforts in the event of war,
the country might prove a great temptation to a resourceful enemy.
The realization
that Canada was once again to become embroiled in another war, far from
her native shores, did not come overnight; but the magnitude of what was
meant by the term - total war - did. Canada, with vast numbers of
nations of foreign extraction or birth, spread from coast to coast, could
prove fertile ground for the few who might profess sympathy for the axis,
although the large majority were loyal to their country of adoption.
It was a natural supposition that the civil authorities, already well aware
of the danger of such a situation arising, could not be expected to cope
with the added burden of ensuring the security of the Army, its personnel
and its material. It was natural too, that the rapid mobilization
programme could prove an easy entry into an Army for an enemy agent or
sympathizer, and thus afford him the opportunity to do damage where it
could harm the country the most. Such was the situation which faced
those who were to carry the work of the Corps at the outbreak of war.
At the start,
the Corps was small, embracing only those whose specialized knowledge and
skill in civilian life were adaptable to meet the situation as it then
existed. As time went on, the ramifications of the Corps grew with
the assumption of more and more duties until towards the close of the war,
the Corps had an amazing variety of personnel working on an equally amazing
variety of tasks, all of them having a direct association with intelligence.
Men from all walks of life, many of whom were leading figures in our universities
and colleges, our business and industries, and including nationals of almost
every country on the globe, made up its numbers. It is perhaps the
more striking that their combined efforts were so attuned as to effect
a harmony of purpose in achieving the common goal of defeating the enemy.
In operations,
military intelligence evaluates and interprets information which indicates
the capacity, ability and will of a foreign army, in whole or in part,
to wage war. It is also comprises the denial to an enemy of similar
information concerning our own situation, capabilities and intentions.
The application of this principle in Canada throughout the war necessitated
the employment of the Corps on such vital tasks as instilling security
habits into the Army and training selected personnel for appointments within
the Corps, either in Canada or abroad. Canadian Intelligence staff
officers in this country worked in close collaboration with the censorship
authorities and prepared instructive material on security requirements
for the confidential information of the press. Later, when the flow
of captured prisoners of war commenced to arrive in Canada, personnel from
the Corps were instrumental in uncovering some sinister Nazi organizations
and pressure groups operating in the camps and in promoting the segregation
and re-education of those prisoners of war whom it was possible to retrieve.
Abroad, with the
arrival in England of the 1st Canadian Division, and later the 2nd Canadian
Division, Canadian Intelligence Corps (C INT C) personnel were withdrawn
and despatched to British Intelligence Schools for more advanced training.
On conclusion of their course they were attached to the intelligence staffs
of the 'more seasoned' British formations, while their places in the Canadian
Forces were filled temporarily by British intelligence officers who had
served in France and Belgium prior to Dunkirk. Gradually, as the
Canadians became more proficient, they replaced their British colleagues
until, finally, there emerged within the Corps the permanent framework
which it was to maintain throughout the hostilities. The First Canadian
Division began to see action in Sicily, Italy, following the landings at
Dieppe by the Second Division, where the C INT C took its first casualties
of the war. Captain TM Insinger was killed when his LCT was blown
up, Captain F Morgan was killed shortly after he came ashore. In
the Field Security Group, Company Sergeant Major (CSM) JS Milne and Sergeants
J Holt and W Corson were killed and five others captured for a total of
ten C INT C casualties at Dieppe. Later, in the Mediterranean Theatre,
Corporal AD Yaritch was killed while on duty in the Adriatic, and in North
West Europe Sergeants GA Osipoff and F Dummer were killed while on operations
in France.
The establishment
in the winter of 1942-43 of the First Canadian Army Headquarters brought
a periods of tremendous expansion to the Corps, for it involved the creation
of a multitude of new establishments. To provide sufficient interrogators,
document teams, photo interpreters, field press censors and the like, that
were now required, the Army overseas was thoroughly combed. Personnel
who had previously been dispatched to gain valuable experience with the
renowned British Eighth Army, then in North Africa, to the American Headquarters
in Casablanca and to the Middle East Headquarters in Cairo, were recalled
to the United Kingdom to help in the re-organization. In Canada,
suitably trained intelligence reinforcements were dispatched overseas as
fast as training facilities permitted. On their arrival in the United
Kingdom, their cycle of training completed by attending 'finishing schools'
operated jointly by Canadian and British Intelligence Corps staffs.
Finally, for the first time in the history of the Canadian Army, intelligence
requirements for all formations and units within the Canadian Army were
filled by Canadian personnel. then began that long period of preparation
for that historic day, June 6th 1944 when the allies unleashed their might
and power against that of the Axis.
Once firmly established
on French soil, Canadian Intelligence Corps personnel began to put into
practice the principles they had learned in England, North Africa, Sicily
and Italy. As the Allied armies advanced eastwards through France,
groups of "stay behind" enemy agents were rapidly ferreted from their places
of concealment and, if of French nationality, turned over to the French
for examination and trial. Caches of explosives, to destroy key points,
personnel and equipment, were retrieved from underground storage vaults
and rendered harmless. So effective were these efforts that instances
of sabotage were few and isolated. Other branches of intelligence
were similarly active. Captured enemy personnel and material were
subjected to the most thorough examination to keep pace with the ever changing
enemy order of battle (ORBAT) and improvements in weapons and equipment.
Indications of changes in the identity of formations along the enemy front
were gleaned from interception and decoding of this wireless activity,
reports from Canadian reconnaissance patrols, tactical air reconnaissance,
photographs and captured documents. All such information was carefully
scrutinized, evaluated and passed to those charged with planning.
The same activity
and effective results were experienced during the Canadian Army's
drive through Belgium and South Holland. In December 1944, the German
offensive in the Ardennes, with the object of seizing the River Meuse and
the capture of Liege to prevent the Allies from mounting an attack in the
Aachen sector, was the one occasion when the Canadian Army found itself
on the defensive. Scattered along the length of the Lower Maas, from
Nijmegan in the East to Walcheren Island in the West, elements of the Canadian
Army were disposed to guard the Allies northern flank. Threat of
attack from this quarter became more apparent hourly as evidenced by reports
reaching Canadian Intelligence. Enemy activity along the north bank
of the lower Mass involving mass movement of formations, the erection of
rafting sites and barges and vast numbers of recently positioned gun emplacements
were clear indications to Intelligence that an attack from this direction,
combined with the one already in progress in the Ardennes, was imminent.
As a result, formations of the Canadian units were redeployed to meet the
attack which was later revealed to have been directed at Antwerp but cancelled
due to the failure of the German forces in the Ardennes to reach their
objectives.
In Germany, after
the defeat of the German Armies, personnel of the Canadian Intelligence
Corps, in keeping with previously laid intelligence plans, assisted in
the liquidation of German Intelligence Services, the disbandment of the
Nazi party in all its ramifications, and the de-Nazification of German
institutions. Similar procedures were adopted in Holland, where large
German forces, their escape to the homeland cut off by the Canadians, were
"screened" and those whose names appeared on specially prepared "lists"
arrested and held to await trial.
At the end of
the war, the Canadian Intelligence Corps was several hundred strong and
its personnel were scattered throughout the world. Many of its members
had been seconded to British and American organizations and were employed
in a wide variety of activities including clandestine operations in Europe
and Asia. Corps specialists also assisted in interrogation and document
research during and after the surrender of Japan.
In Ottawa the
first Canadian Director of Military Intelligence was Colonel "Jock" Murray,
who was generally regarded as the "founder of the Corps". It was
he who pointed out the need for a Corps Badge and who recommended that
the badge should be distinctively Canadian.
 |
The rose which
appears in the intelligence badges of other countries was not considered
sufficiently Canadian. A variation of the Corps of Guides badge was
adopted. The main features which were retained in the Canadian Intelligence
Corps badge are the true and magnetic north points. These are surrounded
by a wreathe of maple leaves.
Prior to this
new badge, officers wore the General List badge which comprised of the
Royal Coat of Arms, while NCO's wore the Maple Leaf badge with the King's
crown superimposed on it.
Canada's world
position in 1946 was vastly different from that which pertained in 1919.
the requirement for intelligence and security was recognized and the Canadian
Intelligence Corps (C INT C) was included in the post war regular army.
It was one of the first such Corps to be included in the regular
forces of any nation and referred to by both British and United States
authorities when they eventually created their regular Intelligence Corps
some years later. Curiously, in the immediate post-war period, the
Canadian Intelligence Corps was largely concerned with security duties
and could almost have been called a counter intelligence (CI) corps.
The Gouznko spy case undoubtedly had some influence on this.
The end of the
war also led to a great reduction in the size of the regular forces in
order to conform to peacetime requirements. The officers and men
of the active component of the C INT C were either employed in intelligence
duties or served tours of duty with other branches of the army in order
to acquire a broader knowledge of military affairs.
As early as 1947
the Corps operated an intelligence training school at Camp Petawawa where
courses were conducted for both active and later reserve force personnel
of all Corps. In 1948, the Canadian Militia was authorized six Intelligence
Training Companies, No. 1 in Montreal; No. 2 in Toronto; No. 3 in Halifax;
No.4 in Vancouver; No.5 in Winnipeg and No.6 in Edmonton. The basic
aim of these companies was to provide a pool of trained manpower to augment
the Regular Force in the 1950's with the onset of the Korean War.
It was during this same period that Field Security Sections and other Corps
representatives were dispatched to both Korea and Germany.
The contribution
of the Canadian Intelligence Corps to the United Nations Force in Korea
was expressed by the inclusion of No.1 Field Security Section within 24
Canadian Infantry Brigade. This section was recruited throughout
Quebec and Central Commands and included representatives of both active
and reserve forces. With the formation of the 27 Canadian Infantry
Brigade, for duty with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), came
the mobilization of No. 1 Reserve Force Intelligence Training Company of
Montreal to form the No.2 Field Security Section for operations in Europe.
This section was perpetuated in recent years by the Headquarters 4 Canadian
Mechanized Brigade group (HQ 4 CMBG) Field Security Section, located in
Lahr, Germany until 1993, when the Canadian Army were withdrawn from Europe.
The other intelligence
staffs/sections that were also formed at approximately the same time were
apart of the Headquarters of Canadian Forces, 27 Brigade and the Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 1st Air Division/ Air Group. These
sections remained until 1993, when al Canadian Forces were withdrawn from
Central Europe (Germany).
In 1952 training
activities were moved to Camp Borden where the Canadian School of
Military Intelligence opened. The school was the centre for training
Corps members of both the Regular and Militia Forces, as well as personnel
from other Corps services. The school was regarded as the home of
the Corps and was the Only regular establishment which flew the Corps flag
made of dark green rayon with the Corps badge centre, embroidered in silver
bouillon. During the 1950's and 60's, members of the Corps were engaged
in a variety of intelligence functions. Officers held a number of
intelligence and other staff appointments throughout Canada. A small
counter intelligence (CI) detachment was located in Germany and officers
and men were located in the United Kingdom, United States and Cyprus.
A number of Corps officers and men remained engaged in security details
but an increasing number were involved in imagery interpretation and strategic
and combat intelligence duties.
Canadian photo
interpreters had been trained in the UK during the war, but starting in
1948, a school was formed at Rivers, Manitoba called the JOINT AIR PHOTO
INTERPRETATION SCHOOL (JAPIS). In 1950, the AIR PHOTO INTERPRETATION
CENTRE (APIC) was formed at Rockcliffe. Three Lancaster's flown by
408 Squadron flew photo recce missions covering northern airfields and
mapping the north. In 1953, the Army Photo Interpretation (PI) Centre,
called the Number One ARMY PHOTO INTERPRETATION SECTION (APIS) was
formed, and also located at Rockcliffe. The APIS also covered Naval
area of interest. In 1960, the school at Rivers closed, APIC and
APIS ceased to function and all three were amalgamated to form the JOINT
PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTRE (JAPIC) making it fully responsible
for training PI's.
In 1959, the Directorate
of Air Intelligence (DAI) was located at Beaver Barracks in Ottawa, where
it looked after photo analysis. The C INT C staff and intelligence
staff for the Royal Canadian Navy were located in National Defence
Headquarters under the Director General Intelligence (DGI). In 1965
a further integration took place, JAPIC became the DEFENCE PHOTOGRAPHIC
INTERPRETATION CENTRE (DPIC). Between then and 1974, DPIC changed
to the CANADIAN FORCES PHOTO INTERPRETATION UNIT (CFPIU), although two
groups of PI's were detached to DGI to work on special projects.
In 1975, these two groups along with desk analysts formed DIRECTORATE
DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE (DDI) 2-7 and were moved to Tunney's Pasture.
In 1978, CFPU also moved to the same location, and in 1980, on instruction
from the CDS, CFPIU was disbanded and with DDI 2-7, formed DDI 6.
In 1986 an expansion of DDI 6 lead to the formation of the Directorate
of Imagery Exploitation (DIE).
It should be noted
that the three separate arms of the Canadian Forces were integrated on
the 1st of January 1968. This in turn led to the formation of the
CF Security Branch in 1969. Until this time, the C INT C provided
intelligence personnel; for the Canadian Army while the RCAF was served
by the Clerk Intel trade and the RCN simply employed operational personnel
on intelligence duties.
 |
On integration
of these services into the Canadian Forces in 1968, members of the C INT
C and the Clerk Intel trade of the RCAF were amalgamated, along with members
of the Canadian Provost Corps and the Air Force Police, into the Security
Branch of the Canadian Forces. All members wore the "Thunderbird"
as cap insignia. Members of the Branch were designated Military Police
(MP 811) or Intelligence Operators (IntOp 111) and as Security Officer
(Sec MP 81B), or Intelligence Officer (Sec Int 81D). The theory,
at the time, was that personnel would be cross trained; ie, an officer
with primary training and experience in intelligence duties could eventually
be given training in and posted to security duties. In practice,
this seldom occurred.
During the period
1968 to 1981, at least three formal studies were conducted to assess the
efficiency and the effectiveness of grouping the security and intelligence
functions into one branch. Eventually, in late 1981, the CDS was
convinced that sufficient disparity in duties existed - that
the functions should be separated, and concurred with a study recommending
that the existing Security Branch be split into two separate Branches.
The security and Police functions were to remain in the Security Branch
and a new Intelligence Branch was to be created. Insignia were rapidly
designed, received Royal assent and entered production. Sir William
Stephenson, CC, MC, DFC - " A Man Called Intrepid ", graciously accepted
the appointment as first Colonel Commandant of the Intelligence Branch.
The official date designated by the CDS for the formation of the new Branch
was 1 October 1982. However, members of the new Branch successfully
argued to have the actual re-badging held on 29 October 1982 -- the 40th
Anniversary of the birth of the Canadian Intelligence Corps -- and on that
date Canadian Intelligence personnel wore the new badge for the first time.
Since that time, Sir William Stephenson has been
succeeded by Brigadier General R.J.C Weeks, continuing the tradition of
the Intelligence Branch that began with the appointment of General H.D.G.
Crerar as the first Honorary Colonel Commandant of the Canadian Intelligence
Corps.
It should also be noted that the present Intelligence
Branch badge continues the heritage of Military Intelligence in Canada:
 |
Return to SHQ
Old Ironside's 1998