GEOGRAPHY
Size: Area of Iraq variously cited as between 433,970 (excluding
Iraqi half of Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone shared with Saudi Arabia,
consisting of 3,522 square kilometers) and 437,393 square kilometers.
Topography: Country divided into four major regions: desert in
west and southwest; rolling upland between upper Euphrates and Tigris rivers;
highlands in north and northeast; and alluvial plain in central and southeast
sections.
TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Roads: Paved road network almost doubled between 1979 and 1985,
to 22,397 kilometers. Also 7,800 kilometers of unpaved secondary and feeder
roads. In 1987 1,000 kilometer-long segment of international express highway
from Mediterranean to Persian Gulf under construction.
Railroads: By 1985 2,029 kilometers of railroads, of which 1,496
were standard gauge, rest meter gauge.
Ports: Basra was main port, together with newer port at Umm Qasr.
Oil terminals at Mina al Bakr, Khawr al Amayah, and Al Faw, latter recaptured
from Iran in 1988, and industrial port at Khawr az Zubayr. War with Iraq
damaged port facilities and prevented use of most ports.
Pipelines: Local lines to Persian Gulf and new spur line from
Basra area to Saudi Arabia's Petroline (running from Eastern Province of
Saudi Arabia to Red Sea port of Yanbu), with 500,000 bpd capacity, completed
in 1985 because Syria cut off use of pipelines through Syria following
outbreak of Iran-Iraq War. Further parallel pipeline to Saudi Arabia with
400,000 bpd capacity under construction in 1988. Pipeline from Baiji to
Baghdad and from Baghdad to Khanaqin; pipeline also between Baiji and Turkish
Mediterranean port of Dortyol opened in 1977 with 800,000 to 900,000 bpd
capacity, expanded by 500,000 bpd capacity in 1987. Small pipelines distributed
refined products to major consuming areas.
Airports: International airports at Baghdad and Basra, with new
airport under construction at Baghdad. Also ninety-five airfields, sixty-one
with permanent-surface runways.
Telecommunications: In 1988 Iraq had a good telecommunications
network of radio communication stations, radio relay links, and coaxial
cables. Iraqi radio and television stations came under the government's
Iraqi Broadcasting and Television Establishment, which was responsible
to the Ministry of Culture and Information. The domestic service had one
FM and nine AM stations with two program networks. The domestic service
broadcast mainly in Arabic, but also in Kurdish, Turkoman, and Assyrian
from Kirkuk. The short wave foreign service broadcast in Arabic, Azeri
Turkish, English, French, German, Hebrew, Kurdish, Persian, Russian, Spanish,
and Urdu. Television stations were located in the major cities, and they
carried two program networks. In 1988 Iraq had approximately 972,000 television
sets; the system was connected to both the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean
systems of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) as well as to one Soviet Intersputnik satellite station. It
also had coaxial cable and radio relays linking it to Jordan, Kuwait, Syria,
and Turkey. Iraq had an estimated 632,000 telephones in 1988.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM in 1988 was in what was officially characterized
as a "transitional" phase. This description meant that the current method
of rule by decree, which had been in effect since 1968, would continue
until the goal of a socialist, democratic republic with Islam as the state
religion was attained. The end of the transition period was to be marked
by the formal enactment of a permanent constitution. The timing and the
specific circumstances that would terminate the transitional stage had
not been specified as of early 1988.
The country remained under the regime of the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection)
Party, which had seized power through a coup d'etat in July 1968. The legality
of government institutions and actions was based on the Provisional Constitution
of July 16, 1970, which embodied the basic principles of the Baath Party--
Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. These principles were in turn rooted
in the pan-Arab aspirations of the party, aspirations sanctified through
identification with the historic right and destiny of all Arabs to unite
under the single leadership of "the Arab Nation."
The most powerful decision-making body in Iraq, the tenmember Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC), which functioned as the top executive and legislative
organ of the state, was for all practical purposes an arm of the Baath
Party. All members of the RCC were also members of the party's Regional
Command, or state apparatus. President Saddam Husayn was both the chairman
of the RCC and the secretary general of the Baath's Regional Command. He
was generally recognized as the most powerful political figure in the country.
From its earliest days, the Baath Party was beset by personality clashes
and by factional infighting. These problems were a primary cause of the
failure of the first Baath attempt to govern Iraq in 1963. After the Baath
returned to power in 1968, intraparty fissures were generally held in check,
albeit not eliminated, by President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr. When Saddam Husayn
succeeded to the presidency in 1979, he also commanded the loyalty of the
major elements of the Baath.
Saddam Husayn and other Baath leaders have always regarded the ability
to balance endemic intraparty tensions--such as those between military
and civilian elements and among personalities across boundaries of specialization--as
the key to success in Baghdad. Above all, they perceived harmony in the
militarycivilian coalition as pivotal. Although the Baath had begun recruiting
within the Iraqi military as early as 1958, and within ten years military
members constituted the backbone of the party's power, civilian Baath leaders
maintained overall control of the party.
Iraqi politics under the Baath regime were generally geared toward mobilizing
support for the regime. Loyal opposition had no place, and it was not recognized
as legitimate. The party leaders believed competitive politics ill-suited
to Iraq, at least during the indefinite transitional period. They condemned
partisan political activity, which they insisted had had damaging consequences
on national unity and integration. The Baath also invoked Iraq's unhappy
legacy of ethnic and regional cleavages as justification for harsh curbs
on political rights.
In 1988, twenty years after the Baath had come to power, it still was
not possible to assess popular attitudes toward Saddam Husayn, toward the
Baath Party, toward political institutions, or toward political issues
because there had been insufficient field research in the country. Even
though elections for a National Assembly had been held in 1980 and again
in 1984, these had been carefully controlled by the government, and genuinely
free elections had not been held for more than thirty years. Politicians
or groups opposed to the principles of the 1968 Baath Revolution of July
17 to 30 were not permitted to operate openly. Those who aspired to be
politically active had few choices: they could join the highly selective
Baath Party, remain dormant, go underground or into exile, or join the
Baath-sponsored Progressive National Front (PNF).
The PNF, which came into existence in 1974, was based on a national
action charter that called for collaboration between the Baath and each
of the other parties considered to be both progressive and nationalist.
The PNF served as the only riskfree , non-Baath forum for political participation,
although even this channel was denied to those whose loyalties to the regime
were suspect. The Baath Party's objectives in establishing the front were
to provide the semblance of broad popular support for the government as
well as to provide the facade of alliance among the Baath and other parties.
The Baath, however, held a dominant position within the front and therefore
assumed sole responsibility for carrying out the decisions of the front's
executive commission, which was composed of the Baath's most important
members and sympathizers.
In early 1988, the war with Iran continued to preoccupy Saddam Husayn
and his associates. Approximately 75,000 Iraqis had been killed in the
war, and about 250,000 had been wounded; more than 50,000 Iraqis were being
held as prisoners of war in Iran. Property damage was estimated in the
tens of billions of dollars; destruction was especially severe in the southern
part of the country.
The Army
Organization and Disposition
Size, Equipment, and Organization
During the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the Iraqi armed forces underwent
many changes in size, structure, arms supplies, hierarchy, deployment,
and political character. Headquartered in Baghdad, the army--of an estimated
1.7 million or more Iraqis, including reserves (actual numbers not available)
and paramilitary--in 1987 had seven corps, five armored divisions (each
with one armored brigade and one mechanized brigade), and three mechanized
divisions (each with one armored brigade and two or more mechanized brigades).
An expanded Presidential Guard Force was composed of three armored brigades,
one infantry brigade, and one commando brigade. There were also thirty
infantry divisions, composed of the People's Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi--also
cited as the Popular Army or People's Militia) brigades and the reserve
brigades, as well as six Special Forces brigades.
This growth in the manpower and equipment inventories of the Iraqi armed
forces was facilitated by Iraq's capacity to pay for a large standing army
and was occasioned by Iraq's need to fight a war with Iran, a determined
and much larger neighbor. Whereas in 1978 active-duty military personnel
numbered less than 200,000, and the military was equipped with some of
the most sophisticated weaponry of the Soviet military arsenal, by 1987
the quality of offensive weapons had improved dramatically, and the number
of new under arms had increased almost fourfold (see table 10, Appendix).
Army equipment inventories increased significantly during the mid-1980s.
Whereas in 1977 the army possessed approximately 2,400 tanks, including
several hundred T-62 models, in 1987 the International Institute for Strategic
Studies estimated that Iraq deployed about 4,500 tanks, including advanced
versions of the T72 . Other army equipment included about 4,000 armored
vehicles, more than 3,000 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, a
number of FROG-7 and Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles with a range of
up to 300 kilometers, and an array of approximately 4,000 (some self-propelled)
antiaircraft guns. The vast majority of the army's equipment inventory
was of Soviet manufacture, although French and Brazilian equipment in particular
continued to be acquired in Iraq's ongoing attempt to diversify its sources
of armaments (see table 11, Appendix). This mammoth arsenal gave Iraq a
clear-cut advantage over Iran in 1987. Iraq had an advantage of more than
four to one in tanks (4,500 to 1,000); four to one in armored vehicles
(4,000 to 1,000); and two to one in artillery and antiaircraft pieces (7,330
to 3,000). Despite this quantitative and qualitative superiority, the Iraqi
army by the end of 1987 had not risked its strength in a final and decisive
battle to win the war.
Headquartered in Basra, the 5,000-man navy was the smallest branch of
the armed forces in early 1988, and, in contrast to the Iranian navy, had
played virtually no role in the war. Iraq's second naval facility at Umm
Qasr took on added importance after 1980, in particular because the Shatt
al Arab waterway, which leads into Basra, was the scene of extensive fighting.
It was at Umm Qasr that most of the Iraqi navy's active vessels were based
in early 1988. Between 1977 and 1987, Iraq purchased from the Soviet Union
eight fast-attack OSA-class patrol boats--each equipped with Styx surface-to-surface
missiles (SSMs). In late 1986, from Italy, Iraq obtained four Lupo class
frigates, and six Wadi Assad class corvettes equipped with Otomat-2 SSMs.
Although the four frigates and the six corvettes was held in Italy under
an embargo imposed by the Italian government, these purchases signaled
Iraq's intention to upgrade its naval power. Observers speculated that
the end of the war with Iran could be followed by a rapid expansion of
the Iraqi navy, which could exercise its influence in northern Persian
Gulf waters (see table 12, Appendix).
In 1987 the Iraqi air force consisted of 40,000 men, of whom about 10,000
were attached to its subordinate Air Defense Command. The air force was
headquartered in Baghdad, and major bases were located at Basra, H-3 (site
of a pump station on the oil pipeline in western Iraq), Kirkuk, Mosul,
Rashid, and Ash Shuaybah. Iraq's more than 500 combat aircraft were formed
into two bomber squadrons, eleven fighter-ground attack squadrons, five
interceptor squadrons, and one counterinsurgency squadron of 10 to 30 aircraft
each. Support aircraft included two transport squadrons. As many as ten
helicopter squadrons were also operational, although these formed the Army
Air Corps. The Air Defense Command piloted the MiG-25, MiG-21, and various
Mirage interceptors and manned Iraq's considerable inventory of surfaceto
-air missiles (SAMs).
The equipment of the air force and the army's air corps, like that of
the other services, was primarily of Soviet manufacture. After 1980, however,
in an effort to diversify its sources of advanced armaments, Iraq turned
to France for Mirage fighters and for attack helicopters. Between 1982
and 1987, Iraq received or ordered a variety of equipment from France,
including more than 100 Mirage F-1s, about 100 Gazelle, Super-Frelon, and
Alouette helicopters, and a variety of air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles,
including Exocets. Other attack helicopters purchased included the Soviet
Hind equipped with AT-2 Swatter, and BO-105s equipped with AS-11 antitank
guided weapons. In addition, Iraq bought seventy F-7 (Chinese version of
the MiG-21) fighters, assembled in Egypt. Thus Iraq's overall airpower
was considerable (see table 13, Appendix).
Although Iraq expanded its arms inventory, its war efforts may have
been hindered by poor military judgment and by lack of resolve. Saddam
Husayn was the country's head of state and premier as well as the chairman
of both the RCC and the Baath Party; moreover, in 1984 he assumed the rank
of field marshal and appointed himself commander in chief of the Iraqi
armed forces. Iraqi propaganda statements claimed that Saddam Husayn had
"developed new military ideas and theories of global importance," but few
Western military analysts gave credence to such claims. Since 1980 General
Adnan Khairallah, who served as both deputy commander in chief of the armed
forces and minister of defense, was the highest officer in the military
chain of command. In 1987 he also assumed the position of deputy prime
minister. His multiple roles reflected the predominance of the army in
the organizational structure of the armed forces. Sattar Ahmad Jassin was
appointed secretary general of defense and adjutant of the armed forces
in 1985. General Abd al Jabar Shanshal assumed the position of chief of
the armed forces general staff in 1984. Frequent changes at the general
staff level indicated to foreign observers that Iraq's military failures
were primarily the result of poor leadership and an overly rigid command
structure. Defective leadership was evident in the lack of clear orders
and in the poor responses by the army in the occupation of Susangerd. In
October 1980, armored units twice advanced and withdrew from the city,
and later in the same operation, the army abandoned strategic positions
near Dezful. Rigid control of junior officers and of noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) frustrated their initiative and may have been the reason for the
high casualty figures in the infantry, where initiative and spontaneity
in decision making can be of paramount importance. The command structure
reportedly was even more inflexible and slow in the People's Army detachments,
where political commanders routinely made military decisions.
Military Industry
Iran-Iraq War and the Quest for New Sources of Arms
As a result of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was obliged to extend its search
for arms in 1981. By the time the war entered its eighth year in September
1987, Iraq had become the world's biggest single arms market. In addition
to its purchases from the Soviet Union and France, Iraq sought to buy armaments
from China, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Italy, Brazil,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Egypt, among others. The United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency estimated in 1987 that Iraq had imported
about US$24 billion worth of military equipment during the period from
1981 to 1985.
Arms from the Soviet Union
From 1972 to 1979, the percentage of Iraq's military equipment supplied
by the Soviet Union declined from 95 to 63 percent. Even so, in 1987 the
Soviet Union, having provided more than US$8 billion worth of weapons since
1980, was Iraq's most important arms supplier. In its 1987 annual study,
Soviet Military Power, the United States Department of Defense stated that,
while maintaining official neutrality in the IranIraq War, the Soviet Union
had provided extensive military assistance to Iraq, and at the same time,
continued its efforts to gain leverage on Iran. In early 1987, Moscow delivered
a squadron of twenty-four MiG-29 Fulcrums to Baghdad. Considered the most
advanced fighter in the Soviet arsenal, the MiG-29 previously had been
provided only to Syria and India. The decision to export the MiG-29 to
Iraq, also assured Iraq a more advantageous payment schedule than any offered
by the West and it reflected Soviet support for one of its traditional
allies in the Middle East. Caught in a financial crisis, Baghdad welcomed
the low-interest loans Moscow extended for this equipment.
Although the Soviets might not receive payments for several years, the
sale of military hardware remained a critical source of revenue for them,
and they have tried to retain Iraq as a customer. In May 1987, for example,
the Soviets provided Iraq with better financial terms in a successful effort
to prevent Iraq from buying sixty French Mirage 2000 fighters for an estimated
US$3 billion. An additional US$3 billion in sales of helicopters and radar
equipment may also have been denied to the French, although it was not
possible to determine whether the Soviets agreed to fulfill both requirements.
In early 1988, Iraq owed the Soviet Union between US$8 billion and US$10
billion in military debts alone.
Arms from France
France became a major military supplier to Iraq after 1975 as the two
countries improved their political relations. In order to obtain petroleum
imports from the Middle East and strengthen its traditional ties with Arab
and Muslim countries, France wanted a politico-military bridge between
Paris and Baghdad.
Between 1977 and 1987, Paris contracted to sell a total of 133 Mirage
F-1 fighters to Iraq. The first transfer occurred in 1978, when France
supplied eighteen Mirage F-1 interceptors and thirty helicopters, and even
agreed to an Iraqi share in the production of the Mirage 2000 in a US$2
billion arms deal. In 1983 another twenty-nine Mirage F-1s were exported
to Baghdad. And in an unprecedented move, France "loaned" Iraq five SuperEtendard
attack aircraft, equipped with Exocet AM39 air-to- surface missiles, from
its own naval inventory. The SuperEtendards were used extensively in the
1984 tanker war before being replaced by several F-1s. The final batch
of twenty-nine F1s was ordered in September 1985 at a cost of more than
US$500 million, a part of which was paid in crude oil.
In 1987 the Paris-based Le Monde estimated that, between 1981 and 1985,
the value of French arms transfers to Iraq was US$5.1 billion, which represented
40 percent of total French arms exports. Paris, however, was forced to
reschedule payment on most of its loans to Iraq because of Iraq's hard-pressed
wartime economy and did so willingly because of its longer range strategic
interests. French president François Mitterand was quoted as saying that
French assistance was really aimed at keeping Iraq from losing the war.
Iraqi debts to France were estimated at US$3 billion in 1987.
French military sales to Iraq were important for at least two reasons.
First, they represented high-performance items. Iraq received attack helicopters,
missiles, military vehicles, and artillery pieces from France. Iraq also
bought more than 400 Exocet AM39 air-to-surface missiles and at least 200
AS30 laserguided missiles between 1983 and 1986. Second, unlike most other
suppliers, France adopted an independent and unambiguous arms sales policy
towards Iraq. France did not tie French arms commitments to Baghdad's politico-military
actions, and it openly traded with Iraq even when Iranian-inspired terrorists
took French hostages in Lebanon. In late 1987, however, the French softened
their Persian Gulf policy, and they consummated a deal with Tehran involving
the exchange of hostages for detained diplomatic personnel. It was impossible
in early 1988 to determine whether France would curtail its arms exports
to Iraq in conjunction with this agreement.
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